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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine whether directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance affects a firm’s cost of 
equity. We find a positive association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity. 
Information quality and risk-taking appear to be two underlying channels through which 
D&O insurance affects the cost of equity. Further tests suggest that this positive association 
is not due to optimal risk-taking, as evidenced by a negative market reaction to an increase 
in D&O insurance coverage, a lack of improvement in firms’ cash flow and a low valuation 
associated with D&O insurance. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the notion that 
D&O insurance weakens the disciplining effect of shareholder litigation, leading to an 
increase in the cost of equity. 
 
Keywords: legal liabilities, directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance; cost of equity; investor 
protection 
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1. Introduction 
Private enforcement via shareholder litigation is important to investor protection and 
stock market development (La Porta et al., 2006). Prior literature suggests that 
cross-country variation in shareholder litigation threat affects the cost of equity (Hail and 
Leuz, 2009; Khurana and Raman, 2004). However, there is relatively scant evidence on how 
firm-level mechanisms affect the disciplining role of shareholder litigation and therefore 
the cost of equity. This research question is important as the cost of equity is a summary 
measure of how investors perceive the risk and return tradeoff of investing in a firm 
(Francis et al., 2004). In addition, the cost of equity plays a key role in corporate financing 
and capital budgeting decisions. In this study, we examine how directors’ and officers’ 
liability insurance (D&O insurance) affects a firm’s cost of equity. 
D&O insurance is a policy purchased by a firm to cover defense cost and potential 
damage award when its directors and officers (D&Os) are sued. By effectively shielding 
D&Os from bearing personal financial liabilities, D&O insurance reduces the disciplining 
effect of shareholder litigation (Baker and Griffith, 2010). We hypothesize that D&O 
insurance increases a firm’s cost of equity via two important channels. First, as shareholder 
litigation encourages managers to increase transparency (Ball, 2001), D&O insurance can 
result in poor financial reporting and disclosure quality, leading to a higher cost of equity 
(Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). Second, as D&O insurance limits the expected legal liabilities 
associated with bad outcomes of D&O decisions, it encourages risk-taking (Baker and 
Griffith, 2010; Core, 1997). To the extent that risk-taking results in a higher exposure to 
market risks, the cost of equity is higher. 
Using a large manually collected dataset on D&O insurance from Canada, we find that 
D&O insurance coverage is positively associated with the ex ante cost of equity implied in 
stock prices and analyst forecasts. This association is robust to firm fixed effects regression 
and alternative cost of equity measures. It is also economically significant. Based on our 
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baseline model, an increase in D&O insurance coverage by one standard deviation is 
associated with an increase in the cost of equity of about 7% of the sample mean. 
The positive association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity can be driven by 
endogeneity as D&O insurance purchase is a firm’s choice. It can be the case that high risks 
lead to both high D&O insurance coverage and a high cost of equity. We conduct extensive 
tests to mitigate this concern. First, we control for economic determinants of liability 
coverage and corporate governance quality (Chen et al., 2011; Core 1997, 2000). We continue 
to find a positive association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity. Second, we 
conduct a lead-lag change analysis. If it is risk, which is already known by investors and 
manifested in the cost of equity, determines a firm’s decision to purchase D&O insurance, 
then a change in the cost of equity should precede a change in D&O insurance. In contrast, 
our hypothesis predicts that a change in the cost of equity follows a change in D&O 
insurance coverage. We find that a change in the cost of equity follows, but not precedes, a 
change in D&O insurance coverage. 
Next, we examine the market reaction to the release of proxy circulars that contain D&O 
insurance information. A short-term market event study is less likely to suffer from the 
omitted correlated variable bias. If investors charge a high cost of equity for firms with a 
high level of D&O insurance coverage, then they would react negatively to the disclosure of 
an increase in D&O insurance. Our finding is consistent with this prediction. 
It is also possible that the D&O insurance purchase decision is based on D&Os’ private 
information that is learnt by investors subsequently (the risk anticipation argument).1 If 
this is the case, we can still observe that a change in the cost of equity follows, but not 
precedes, a change in D&O insurance coverage. In addition, the disclosure of an increase in 
D&O insurance can reveal D&O’s private information on an increase in risk and therefore 
lead to a negative market reaction. While the risk anticipation argument and our hypothesis 
                                                            
1  We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility. 
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are not mutually exclusive as a change in D&O insurance can reveal both D&Os’ private 
information and an expected change in D&Os’ behavior, empirically distinguishing them is 
difficult as D&Os’ private information is not directly observable. Nevertheless, we conduct 
several tests to address this concern. First, we control for an ex ante measure of litigation 
risk developed by Kim and Skinner (2012) and continue to find a positive association 
between D&O insurance and the cost of equity. Second, we test a cross-sectional prediction 
of the risk anticipation argument. If the association between D&O insurance and the cost of 
equity is driven by D&Os’ private information, then it should be more pronounced when 
D&Os have more private information. Following Chen et al. (2007), we develop proxies for 
D&Os’ private information based on earnings surprises and CEOs’ insider trading activities. 
We do not find a more pronounced association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity 
for firms with D&Os having more private information. 
Ideally, to clearly distinguish the risk anticipation argument from our hypothesis, one 
needs to identify a change in D&O insurance not driven by D&Os’ private information. 
However, we are not aware of decent instrumental variables that are capable of providing 
such identification. As an alternative, we conduct a test of the effect of an exogenous 
reduction in D&Os’ personal legal liabilities on the cost of equity. Nevada swiftly changed its 
corporate law in 2001 in order to attract more firm incorporations. Before the change, 
Nevada’s corporate law imposed similar fiduciary duties on D&Os as those under the 
Delaware corporate law. After the law change, D&Os are only liable if their behaviors 
involve both a breach of the duty of loyalty and an intentional fraud (or a knowing violation 
of the law). This implies that D&Os are no longer liable for a breach of the duty of care 
(Barzuza, 2012). We argue that this law change has a similar effect on reducing D&Os’ 
personal legal liabilities as an increase in D&O insurance coverage. As the legislation 
process was very short, it is unlikely that firms could anticipate the law change and quickly 
reincorporate into Nevada. Thus, this change in D&Os’ legal liabilities is exogenous.  
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Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that the change in the cost of equity 
after this law change is significantly higher for Nevada-incorporated firms than that for a 
sample of non-Nevada-incorporated firms matched on industry, firm size, and the average 
cost of equity before the law change. We observe a similar result when focusing on 
Nevada-incorporated firms that mainly operate outside Nevada. Thus, this result cannot be 
attributed to changes in macroeconomic conditions in Nevada that coincided with the law 
change. Taken together, although it is difficult to completely rule out the risk anticipation 
argument, the positive association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity does not 
appear to be entirely driven by D&Os’ private information. 
Finally, we conduct several tests to better understand the channels through which D&O 
insurance increases the cost of equity. We find that D&O insurance is positively associated 
with the absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals (Kothari et al., 2005), 
bid-ask spread, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure, analysts’ earnings forecast error, and 
the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. This result is consistent with D&O insurance 
reducing financial reporting and disclosure quality, increasing stock illiquidity and investors’ 
estimation risk. We also find that D&O insurance is positively associated with the exposure 
to market risk, consistent with D&O insurance leading to more risk-taking. 
It is possible that firms purchase D&O insurance to optimally motivate D&Os to take 
more risks that benefit shareholders. If this is the case, D&O insurance can be positively 
associated with the cost of equity while at the same time be positively associated with future 
operating performance. We do not find a significantly positive association between D&O 
insurance and future operating performance measured by industry-adjusted return on 
assets. The association, if any, is negative. These results, combined with a negative market 
reaction to the announcement of an increase in D&O insurance, suggest that a high risk 
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associated with high D&O insurance coverage is more likely due to D&Os’ reduced vigilance 
or diligence than due to their optimal risk-taking activities which benefit shareholders.2 
We make two important contributions to the literature. First, prior studies show that 
country-level variation in private enforcement via shareholder litigation plays a pivotal role 
in determining a firm’s cost of equity (Hail and Leuz, 2009; Khurana and Raman, 2004). We 
show that even in common-law countries with stronger legal protection of investors, D&O 
insurance, a firm-level mechanism that reduces the deterrence effect of private litigation, 
increases the cost of equity. This evidence suggests that investors factor D&O insurance 
information in their investment decisions. Since D&O insurance is widespread in North 
America and many other countries, our results have an important policy implication that 
supports mandating the disclosure of D&O insurance (Baker and Griffith, 2010). In addition, 
as D&O insurance weakens the disciplining role of shareholder litigation, we add to the 
research linking corporate governance with a firm’s cost of equity (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2005; Chen et al., 2011). 
Second, we contribute to the research on the consequences of D&O insurance. While 
prior studies have examined the economic determinants of D&O insurance purchases (Boyer, 
2005; Chalmers et al., 2002; Core, 1997; O’Sullivan, 1997; Zou et al., 2008) and the effect of 
D&O insurance on accounting restatements (Kim, 2006), reporting conservatism (Chung 
and Wynn, 2008), management forecasts (Wynn, 2008), investment decisions (Lin et al., 
2011) and loan financing (Lin et al., 2013), we document how D&O insurance affects the cost 
                                                            
2 This point is echoed by Warren Buffet, Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway. For example, in a shareholder 
meeting in 2003, he said: “People would behave a lot better if D&O insurance were scrapped altogether.” (“Costs 
of covering the board are at a premium”, by Andrew Hill, Financial Times, May 6, 2003). This was not the only 
time he criticized D&O insurance. In his annual letter to shareholders in 2010, he emphasized the importance of 
director behaviors as a key factor behind a firm’s long-term stellar performance: “We do not provide them 
directors and officers liability insurance, a given at almost every other large public company. If they mess up 
with your money, they will lose their money as well.” Interestingly, Berkshire Hathaway is one of the most 
important players in the insurance market writing substantial D&O insurance through its insurance 
subsidiaries like General Reinsurance (Gen Re). 
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of equity. Our evidence, together with these prior studies and anecdotal criticisms (e.g., of 
Warren Buffett), point to a cost of D&O insurance. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses background of D&O 
insurance and develops our hypothesis. Section 3 describes data and research design. 
Section 4 presents main empirical results. Section 5 conducts robustness tests dealing with 
the potential endogeneity of D&O insurance. Section 6 provides evidence on channels 
through which D&O insurance affects the cost of equity. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development 
2.1. Institutional background  
Shareholders in Canada can sue firms and their D&Os for misrepresentations in 
securities issuance (primary market liability suits) and in continuous disclosures that do not 
involve securities issuance (secondary market liability suits). In addition, shareholders can 
sue D&Os for a breach of fiduciary duties (derivative suits as the potential recovery goes to 
the firm rather than to the plaintiff). An important way to protect D&Os from bearing 
personal financial liabilities is to purchase D&O insurance. 
D&O insurance is a policy protecting D&Os collectively against allegations of 
“wrongdoings”, including a breach of fiduciary duties and violation of the securities law. The 
policy is primarily intended to protect D&Os, but at the firm’s cost. It contains personal 
coverage (Category A coverage) and corporate indemnity coverage (Category B coverage) 
(Baker and Griffith, 2010). Category A coverage provides direct payment to D&Os when a 
firm is unable to indemnify them due to legal reasons (in a shareholder derivative suit), 
financial distress, or when a firm chooses not to indemnify them. Category B coverage 
enables a firm to recoup the cost it incurs in indemnifying D&Os. Neither Category A nor 
Category B coverage protects a firm from legal liabilities when it is sued. However, a firm 
can add entity coverage (Category C coverage) to cover its own legal cost. 
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We argue that D&O insurance influences D&Os’ behaviors even though the federal 
Canada Business Corporation Act (CBCA) allows a firm to indemnify D&Os’ legal cost via 
its bylaws or charters. First, D&Os believe that D&O insurance is indispensable. A survey 
carried out in 2007 finds that 87% of the 356 directors surveyed rank the availability of 
comprehensive D&O insurance coverage as an important condition before agreeing to join a 
board despite the law’s permission of corporate indemnification.3  
Second, the award of corporate indemnification has three restrictions: (1) D&Os acting in 
good faith, (2) firms remaining solvent, and (3) covering only defense cost subject to court 
approval, but not settlement or damage award in derivative suits.4 While a firm seldom 
refuses to indemnify its D&Os and corporate defaults are rare, these restrictions 
nevertheless create uncertainties to risk-averse D&Os. In contrast, D&O insurance is less 
restrictive and has considerably narrower exclusions that are typically deliberate frauds or 
illegal profits. Moreover, the narrow exclusions of D&O insurance are rarely applied. The 
prevalent practice is that as long as defending D&Os do not confess dishonesty, D&O 
insurers pay the claim (Baker and Griffith, 2010). Therefore, compared with corporate 
indemnification, D&O insurance represents less restrictive and more certain coverage. This 
is why the possibility of corporate indemnification via by-laws does not reduce the demand 
for D&O insurance.  
Our check of a random sample of corporate filings indicates that firms invariably allow 
corporate indemnification of D&Os. However, we find no quantitative disclosure on the 
extent of such indemnification. Therefore, controlling for a binary proxy for corporate 
indemnification in our analysis is not meaningful while controlling for a continuous proxy 
for indemnification is not practical. However, the presence of corporate indemnification is 
                                                            
3 “The Directors & Boards Survey: D&O Insurance” in Boardroom Briefing, Volume 4, No. 1. 
4 The business judgment rule sets a higher hurdle for shareholders to win a derivative suit alleging D&Os’ 
violation of the duty of care than a securities lawsuit. Nevertheless, derivative suits (particularly those that 
allege the violation of the duty of loyalty) do constitute a source of liability.   
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unlikely to materially alter our inference on the effect of D&O insurance due to two reasons: 
1) our result regarding the association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity is 
robust to firm fixed effects estimation and a change regression model. To the extent that 
firms’ indemnification policy is stable, the effect of the time-invariant element of corporate 
indemnification should be captured by firm fixed effects. 2) The time-variant element of 
corporate indemnification can be picked up by proxies for firms’ financial conditions such as 
size, leverage, credit rating and cash holdings (Chung and Wynn, 2008). 
 
2.2. Hypothesis development 
We argue that there are at least two channels through which D&O insurance increases 
the cost of equity. First, D&O insurance weakens the disciplining effect of shareholder 
litigation by decreasing D&Os’ personal legal liabilities. A reduction in legal liabilities can 
lower the quality of financial reporting and disclosure, resulting in a poorer information 
environment. Second, a reduction in legal liabilities can lead to more risk-taking by D&Os.  
 
2.2.1. D&O insurance, reporting/disclosure quality and the cost of equity 
Litigation against D&Os for inadequate and untimely disclosures can encourage D&Os 
to improve transparency to reduce potential legal liabilities (Ball, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Timely and accurate disclosures reduce legal liabilities by mitigating plaintiffs’ 
allegation that D&Os hide the truth, thereby reducing the amount of damage award 
(Skinner, 1994, 1997). Consistent with this notion, Khurana et al. (2006) show that private 
litigation threat is positively associated with earnings quality as measured by the 
predictability of earnings for future operating cash flows. By reducing the expected financial 
liabilities in a lawsuit, D&O insurance can lower D&Os’ care and vigilance in financial 
reporting and disclosure, resulting in errors, omissions, or even frauds (Baker and Griffith, 
2010). Prior studies find that firms with high D&O insurance coverage report less 
 
9 
conservative earnings (Chung and Wynn, 2008), provide fewer bad news management 
forecasts (Wynn, 2008), and are more likely to have accounting restatements (Kim, 2006). 
Thus, a high level of D&O insurance coverage may result in deterioration in financial 
reporting and disclosure quality. 
Financial reporting and disclosure can affect the cost of equity through affecting stock 
liquidity and estimation risk (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) 
suggest that poor disclosure increases the cost of capital by exacerbating information 
asymmetry among investors. A stock becomes illiquid because uninformed investors (market 
makers) reduce their trading volume and increase bid-ask spread in order to limit potential 
losses from trading with informed investors. Such illiquidity increases investors’ trading 
cost. In equilibrium, investors require compensation for expected trading cost by increasing 
the required return. Low quality disclosure thus leads to a high cost of capital. 
Lambert et al. (2007) extend the literature on estimation risk (e.g., Coles et al., 1995) 
and directly examine the effect of accounting information on the cost of capital within a 
CAPM framework. They show that the cost of equity increases with the estimated 
covariance between its cash flow and the cash flow of all other firms in the market, and that 
this effect cannot be diversified. The estimated covariance of cash flows between two firms 
decreases with the precision of information about any of the two firms’ cash flows as 
information about one firm’s cash flow implicitly provides information about the other firm’s 
cash flow. This information removes a source of common variation between the two firms’ 
cash flows and hence reduces the estimated covariance of the cash flows. Low quality 
disclosure increases the estimated covariance of cash flows and consequently inflates the 
cost of equity. 
Consistent with these theories, Welker (1995) finds a negative association between a 
firm’s voluntary disclosure quality and the bid-ask spread of its stock. Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) show that better disclosure is associated with higher accuracy and lower dispersion of 
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analysts’ earnings forecasts. Others find that a lower cost of equity is associated with more 
disclosures (Botosan, 1997) and higher quality financial reporting (Francis et al., 2004). 
Existing evidence also shows that a stronger shareholder litigation environment is 
associated with a lower cost of equity. Hail and Leuz (2009) report that listing in a US 
exchange reduces the cost of equity as cross-listing exposes foreign firms to stronger 
shareholder litigation discipline. Khurana and Raman (2004) document that Big-4 auditors 
help lower the cost of equity in the US but not in Australia, Canada, and the UK, which have 
a similar economic structure but a less litigious environment. 
In sum, D&O insurance coverage may lead to deterioration in financial reporting and 
disclosure quality that increases information asymmetry and non-diversifiable estimation 
risk, leading to a higher cost of equity.  
 
2.2.2. D&O insurance, risk-taking and the cost of equity 
D&Os are risk-averse because they cannot fully diversify risks specific to their claims in 
a firm (Smith and Stulz, 1985) and risks associated with their human capital (Amihud and 
Lev, 1981). The possibility of bearing legal liabilities in shareholder litigations against bad 
outcomes of their decisions can make D&Os even more risk-averse (Core, 1997). Consistent 
with this view, there is evidence that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reduces corporate risk-taking 
as it increases legal liabilities of D&Os (Bargeron et al., 2010). D&O insurance effectively 
limits D&Os’ legal liabilities in lawsuits against bad outcomes of their business decisions. 
Thus, with the protection offered by D&O insurance, D&Os are encouraged to invest in risky 
projects otherwise passed up (Core, 1997; Baker and Griffith, 2010). 
Risk-taking induced by D&O insurance may or may not benefit shareholders. On the one 
hand, D&O insurance can encourage risk-taking activities based on prudent and informed 
decisions that are beneficial to shareholders (which we examine later in the paper). On the 
other hand, D&O insurance can provide D&Os incentives to breach the duty of care, 
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resulting in reduced vigilance, more recklessness or negligence in decision-making (Baker 
and Griffith, 2010). According to Eisenberg (1990), the duty of care requires D&Os to 
reasonably monitor the conduct of business, follow up on information that should raise 
concerns, adopt a reasonable decision-making process and make informed decisions. Breach 
of the duty of care can result in a failure in identifying, gathering information on, and 
assessing risks in business decisions that expose firms to risks harmful to shareholders 
(Bainbridge, 2009). Consistent with this notion, Bradley and Schipnai (1989) find a negative 
market reaction to the enactment of a Delaware legislation that permits firms to include in 
their articles of incorporation a provision that eliminates or limits directors’ personal 
liabilities for a breach of the duty of care. They also find a negative market reaction when 
Delaware firms announce to adopt the provision limiting directors’ legal liabilities. 
Regardless of the nature of risk-taking, a likely outcome of D&O insurance is that it 
encourages D&Os to take risks. Acharya and Bisin (2009) argue that D&Os prefer 
increasing firms’ exposure to the market risk than to the idiosyncratic risk as they can 
hedge the former by trading in financial markets on the market portfolio but cannot 
effectively hedge the latter. Thus, granting more risk-taking incentives (e.g., D&O insurance) 
to D&Os can encourage them to increase a firm’s exposure to the market risk, resulting in a 
higher cost of equity. The above discussions lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: The cost of equity increases in D&O insurance. 
We also note the possibility that the presence of D&O insurance can actually lower a 
firm’s cost of equity via reducing its risk of financial distress.5 Transferring liability risks to 
insurers who have a comparative advantage in managing liability risks can be an efficient 
risk management strategy (Mayers and Smith, 1982). Without D&O insurance coverage, a 
firm may have to resort to corporate resources to indemnify its D&Os for defense cost, 
                                                            
5 In addition, if the presence of D&O insurance leads D&Os to make predictably bad decisions, a firm’s risk and 
cost of equity can be lower. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility. 
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settlement or damage award when they are sued. In addition, in many shareholder suits, 
firms are also named as a defendant together with D&Os. The absence of D&O insurance 
(Category C) exposes a firm to a significant financial risk. Therefore, D&O insurance can 
constitute an integral part of a firm’s overall risk management strategy and help lower its 
default risk and thereby the cost of equity (Core, 1997; Hoyt and Khang, 2000;  Zou and 
Adams, 2008). This possibility adds tension to our prediction and, if valid, makes it more 
difficult for us to find a positive association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Data and sample selection 
We use a sample of Canadian firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) as 
Canada requires the disclosure of D&O insurance purchases. We manually collect D&O 
insurance information from annual proxy circular filings in the System for Electronic 
Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) database for TSE 300 firms for a 13-year period 
starting from 1996.6 Available information about D&O insurance includes whether a firm 
has D&O insurance in a year and the associated personal and corporate coverage limits. 
Personal coverage and corporate indemnity coverage are typically equal. If the proxy 
circular for a firm-year is unavailable, we code the D&O insurance variable as missing.  
We match our D&O insurance data with COMPUSTAT North America. We exclude 
financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999). We then merge the data with the I/B/E/S database to 
obtain analysts’ earnings forecasts. This sample selection procedure results in about 2,000 
firm-year observations used in our baseline regression. Samples used in other analyses are 
the intersections of the D&O insurance sample and other required variables.  
 
3.2. Cost of equity estimates 
                                                            
6 1996 was the first year Canada required electronic filings of corporate disclosures. 
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We estimate the ex ante cost of equity implied in stock prices and analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Following Hail and Leuz (2009), we use the average (RAVG) of the four cost of 
equity estimates by Claus and Thomas (2001) (RCT), Gebhardt et al. (2001) (RGLS), Ohlson 
and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) as implemented by Gode and Mohanram (2003) (ROJ), and the 
modified PEG model by Easton (2004) (RMPEG) as the main proxy. We also employ 
alternative estimates and results are robust. 
3.3. Model specification 
We estimate the following regression to investigate the association between D&O 
insurance and the cost of equity: 
RAVG i,t+1 –RF,t+1 = δ0 + δ1DOICOVi,t + δ2UBETAi,t+1 + δ3STD_RESRETi,t+1 + δ4LnMVi,t  
+ δ5LnBMi,t + δ6LEVi,t + δ7LnRET12i,t+1 + δ8FBIASi,t+1 +δ9FLTGi,t+1 
+δ10XLISTi,t + δ11CASHi,t + δ12RATINGi,t + δ13MISS_RATINGi,t  
+ Industry and Year Indicators + εi,t+1, 
(1) 
where RAVG is the average of RGLS, RCT, ROJ and RMPEG. DOICOV is the D&O insurance 
coverage ratio. Following Chalmers et al. (2002) and Lin et al. (2011), we define DOICOV as 
the amount of personal coverage scaled by the average market value of equity of the year. If 
a firm does not purchase D&O insurance, DOICOV is zero.  
We control for unlevered beta (UBETA), firm size (LnMV), the book-to-market ratio 
(LnBM), leverage (LEV), and the forecast of long-term earnings growth (FLTG) as these 
variables are correlated with the cost of equity (Botosan et al., 2011). We also control for 
idiosyncratic risk (STD_RESRET) as idiosyncratic volatility should matter under 
incomplete information (Merton, 1987). We include LnRET12, the price run-up over a 
twelve-month period to control for analysts’ sluggishness in processing information 
(Nekrasov and Ogneva, 2011) and FBIAS, the forecast bias of forthcoming annual earnings, 
to control for the effect of forecast optimism (Easton and Sommers, 2007). We expect 
negative coefficients on LnRET12 and FBIAS. An indicator for cross-listing in the US 
(XLIST) is included to control for the potential effect of differences in legal protection and 
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disclosure commitment between Canada and the US on the cost of equity. Following Chung 
and Wynn (2008), we include a firm’s cash holdings (CASH) to control for the capacity of 
corporate indemnification of D&Os’ liabilities, though it is a crude measure (Wynn, 2008).  
Firms with a high level of insolvency risk can have a high cost of equity and a high 
demand for D&O insurance. The effect of the insolvency risk is likely partially captured by 
leverage, prior stock return, cash, beta, and idiosyncratic risk. To further capture default 
risk, we control for a firm’s credit rating (RATING). We convert letter S&P credit ratings 
into 22-point numeric ratings with a larger number representing a higher credit rating. 
MISS_RATING equals one if RATING is missing and zero otherwise. RATING is then set to 
zero if missing. Finally, we control for year and Fama and French 30 industry fixed effects. 
Detailed variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 2. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Summary statistics 
Panel A, Table 1 presents summary statistics for key variables. 70.9% of firm-year 
observations carry D&O insurance. The mean insurance coverage is 44.748 million 
Canadian dollars. The mean insurance coverage ratio (DOICOV) is 4.5% and its standard 
deviation is 7.6%, suggesting significant variation in the coverage ratio across firms. The 
mean of (RAVG – RF) is 7.392% and its standard deviation is 5.356%. Panel B compares 
summary statistics of (RAVG – RF) for low and high DOICOV groups classified by the sample 
median of DOICOV. The mean (RAVG – RF) for low coverage firms is 6.854% and it is 7.889% 
for high coverage firms. The difference is significant based on either a t-test (t = -4.473) or a 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z = -4.930), lending preliminary support for our hypothesis.7  
 
                                                            
7 We also partition sample firms with D&O insurance into two groups based on the median DOICOV of these 
firms. Untabulated results show that firms in the high D&O insurance group have a significantly higher cost of 
equity than firms in the low D&O insurance group (t = -5.845; Wilcoxon rank sum z = -5.531). 
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4.2. Regression analysis 
Table 2 reports regression results. Column (1) is based on an OLS regression, which 
serves as our baseline. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. We find 
that D&O insurance is significantly positively associated with the cost of equity (6.931, t = 
3.755), supporting our hypothesis.8 This effect is economically significant. A 
one-standard-deviation increase in DOICOV (0.076) is associated with a 53-basis-point 
increase (6.931×0.076) in the cost of equity, about 7% of the sample mean (7.392%). 
Signs of control variables are consistent with theories and prior empirical findings. The 
cost of equity is positively associated with unlevered beta, idiosyncratic return volatility, 
book-to-market ratio, leverage and long-term growth rate, and is negatively associated with 
firm size, price run-ups and analysts’ forecast bias. The cross-listing indicator, cash holdings, 
and credit rating have insignificant coefficients. To determine whether insolvency risk can 
spuriously cause the positive association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity, we 
drop firm-years with a leverage ratio over the 90th percentile of its distribution and continue 
to find a significantly positive coefficient on D&O insurance. Further, when we drop 
leverage from the model, RATING becomes negatively significant. 
We also examine whether the positive association between D&O insurance and the cost 
of equity is sensitive to model specifications. The Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression (Column 
(2)) and the firm fixed effects regression (Column (3)) show that the association is not 
sensitive to model specifications. Overall, we find a statistically and economically significant 
positive association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity. 
Finally, we check whether our baseline results are robust to alternative measures of the 
cost of equity. First, we use the four individual cost of equity estimates (RGLS, RCT, ROJ, and 
RMPEG) that are used in constructing RAVG. Second, we follow Mohanram and Gode (2011) 
and estimate the cost of equity using analyst forecasts after removing predictable forecast 
                                                            
8 Inference is the same if the standard errors are adjusted for clustering at both firm and year levels (t = 4.407). 
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errors. Finally, we follow Nekrasov and Ogneva (2011) and construct a measure of cost of 
equity estimated simultaneously with the perpetual growth rate. Results on DOICOV 
(untabulated) are qualitatively the same.  
 
5. Endogeneity of D&O insurance coverage 
As D&O insurance is a firm choice, findings in Table 2 can be driven by an endogeneity 
bias. Specifically, it is possible that some omitted correlated variables lead to both a high 
level of D&O insurance and a high cost of equity. This concern is partially addressed by the 
firm fixed effects regression to the extent that omitted variables are constant over time. In 
this section, we conduct additional analyses to mitigate this concern. 
 
5.1. Controlling for determinants of liability coverage and corporate governance quality 
Prior studies (e.g., Core, 1997, 2000; O’Sullivan, 1997) suggest that firms purchase D&O 
insurance at the request of outside directors in the hiring process, as an integral component 
of a risk management strategy to deal with litigation risk, or due to poor corporate 
governance. These determinants of D&O insurance are potentially correlated with the cost 
of equity (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2011). Thus, we examine whether 
our baseline results are robust to further controlling for these determinants that are omitted 
from our baseline models. 
More specifically, we add the following control variables to Equation (1): the proportion 
of outside directors, research and development scaled by sales, return on assets, an indicator 
for having M&As or divestitures in the previous year, an indicator for reporting the 
existence of lawsuits in the previous year, board size, CEO-chairman duality, and equity 
ownership of D&Os. We also include operating cash flow scaled by assets, volatility of 
operating cash flow, and capital expenditure scaled by assets as additional determinants of 
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cash holdings. Results are reported in Column (4) of Table 2. While sample size is reduced by 
about 25%, the coefficient on DOICOV is still positive and significant (t = 3.053). 
 
5.2. Lead-lag change analysis 
It is possible that riskier firms are more likely to have future lawsuits (Kim and Skinner, 
2012) and thus are more likely to purchase D&O insurance in the current period. If the risk 
is known to investors, these firms should also have a higher cost of equity in the current 
period. When the cost of equity continues to be high in the next period, current D&O 
insurance can be positively associated with the cost of equity in the next period. If this is the 
case, then a change in the cost of equity should precede a change in D&O insurance. 
However, our hypothesis predicts that a change in the cost of equity follows a change in 
D&O insurance. We therefore investigate the association between a change in D&O 
insurance and a change in the lead or lagged measures of the cost of equity.  
The change in D&O insurance in year t, DOICOVi,t, is defined as the change in the 
amount of D&O insurance from year t-1 to year t scaled by the average market value of 
equity of year t. The change in the lead cost of equity, (RAVG – RF)i,t+1, is the change in the 
cost of equity in year t+1. The change in the lagged cost of equity, (RAVG – RF)i,t-1, is the 
change in the cost of equity in year t-1. If a change in the cost of equity follows a change in 
D&O insurance, then the association between DOICOVi,t and (RAVG – RF)i,t+1 should be 
positive. If a change in the cost of equity precedes a change in D&O insurance, then the 
association between DOICOVi,t and (RAVG – RF)i,t-1 should be positive. 
Table 3 reports results. We find a significantly positive association between DOICOVi,t 
and (RAVG – RF)i,t+1 (Column (1)), but the association between DOICOVi,t and (RAVG – 
RF)i,t-1 is insignificant (Column (2)). In Column (3), we lag the change in the cost of equity by 
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two years and the association remains insignificant. These results suggest that a change in 
the cost of equity follows a change in D&O insurance, rather than the other way around.  
 
5.3. Market reaction to disclosures of D&O insurance information 
Next, we examine the market reaction to disclosures of D&O insurance information. If 
investors charge a high cost of equity for firms with high D&O insurance coverage, stock 
prices should react negatively when investors learn that firms have increased their D&O 
insurance coverage. A short-window event study is less likely to suffer from the omitted 
correlated variable problem and thus can be used to corroborate our baseline findings. 
While the disclosure of D&O insurance information is compulsory in Canada, there is no 
regulation requiring firms to make announcements upon their purchases of D&O insurance. 
As a result, it is difficult to identify the exact date on which D&O insurance information is 
revealed to the market. Firms typically release D&O insurance information in proxy 
circulars which disclose the arrangement of annual general meetings of shareholders after 
the end of fiscal years. A random search suggests that a proxy circular is the predominant 
public source from which investors learn about a firm’s D&O insurance. 
In most cases a proxy circular is mailed to shareholders on or right after the proxy 
circular date (hereafter referred to as the proxy date, TP). In very few cases the proxy 
circular is mailed within one week after the proxy date. The proxy circular is also filed with 
SEDAR, and the filing date is shown in SEDAR (hereafter referred to as the filing date, TF). 
Our data show that the median (mean) number of trading days between the proxy date and 
the filing date is 8 (9.5). While we are certain that the D&O insurance information reaches 
the market by the filing date, we are less certain as to the exact date on which shareholders 
receive the mailed proxy circular (before the filing date). Following Brickley et al. (1985), we 
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use the period [TP -2, TF +2] as our event window.9 We estimate the following regression to 
determine the market reaction to a change in D&O insurance coverage: 
CARi,t  = δ0 + δ1DOICOVi,t + δ2LnMVi,t + δ3LnBMi,t + εi,t, (2) 
where CARi,t is the cumulative abnormal return over the window [TP -2, TF +2] for fiscal year 
t. Abnormal return is defined as the prediction error of the market model estimated using 
daily stock returns over a one-year period ending 31 days before the proxy date. Other 
variables are as defined earlier.  
We manually collect proxy circular filing dates from the SEDAR system and obtain a 
sample of 4,309 firm-year observations with non-missing filing dates. We then download 
proxy circulars and identify proxy dates in proxy circular letters to shareholders. We lose 
792 observations missing information on the change in D&O insurance coverage and drop 63 
observations missing proxy dates and 22 observations for which filing dates in SEDAR are 
later than annual general meeting dates. Finally, we delete 308 observations missing 
variables used in the model. This procedure results in a sample of 3,124 observations.  
It is important to note a limitation for the event study. D&O insurance is often disclosed 
together with other items in a proxy circular. Typical examples include information on the 
election of directors, appointment of auditors, executive compensation, etc. These factors 
make it difficult to observe a clean market reaction around proxy circular releases. Results 
are reported in Table 4. In Column (1), the coefficient on DOICOV is significantly negative 
(t = -2.113), suggesting that the market reacts negatively to an increase in D&O insurance. 
This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis. While it is impossible to control for all 
confounding news, we make an explicit attempt to check whether results are robust to 
removing confounding earnings announcements. We remove 684 observations with missing 
earnings announcement dates or those with earnings announcement dates falling during the 
                                                            
9 As investors can receive mails of the proxy statements before the filing dates, as a robustness test, we also 
measure the market reaction over the window [TP -2, TP +5]. Results (untabulated) are qualitatively similar. 
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period three trading days before the proxy date and three trading days after the filing date 
(i.e., [TP-3, TF+3]). Results in Column (2) are qualitatively similar.10  
 
5.4. Controlling for D&Os’ anticipation of litigation risk 
The results of the lead-lag analysis minimize the chance of public information on risk as 
an explanation of the positive association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity. 
However, another possibility is that D&Os can purchase insurance based on their private 
information about future adverse changes in a firm’s risk that can lead to a higher litigation 
risk. When the market subsequently learns about D&Os’ private information, the future 
cost of equity is higher. If this is the case, we can still observe that a change in the cost of 
equity follows, but not precedes, a change in D&O insurance. In addition, the market can 
react negatively to a disclosure of an increase in D&O insurance simply because the 
disclosure reveals D&Os’ private information about future litigation. We refer to this as the 
risk anticipation argument. This argument and our hypothesis are not mutually exclusive as 
a change in D&O insurance can reveal D&Os’ private information as well as an expected 
change in D&Os’ behavior. We examine to what extent the risk anticipation argument can 
explain the positive association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity.  
 
5.4.1. Controlling for the expected litigation risk 
First, we determine whether our results survive after controlling for a measure of 
expected litigation risk (LITRISK) developed in Kim and Skinner (2012).11 Results are 
reported in Panel A of Table 5. The coefficient on LITRISK is positive and significant (1.557, 
t = 2.464). However, both the magnitude (6.748) and the significance level (t = 3.654) of the 
                                                            
10 We also find a negative announcement effect of D&O insurance initiations (54 observations after excluding 
observations with confounding earnings news).  
11 Specifically, LITRISK is constructed using regression coefficients of variables in Model 3 of Table 7 in Kim and 
Skinner (2012). They show that this measure is superior to a simple indicator variable based on industry 
membership that is commonly used in many accounting studies. 
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coefficient on DOICOV are similar to those reported in our baseline regression (Column (1) 
of Table 2), suggesting that our results cannot be completely driven by the expected 
litigation risk. In Panel B, we estimate a change model further controlling for the change in 
litigation risk. The inference on ∆DOICOV is qualitatively the same.  
 
5.4.2. D&Os’ private information and the association between D&O insurance and the cost of 
equity 
Second, we test a cross-sectional prediction of the risk anticipation argument. According 
to this argument, the association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity should be 
more pronounced when D&Os have more private information. However, testing this 
prediction is difficult as D&Os’ private information is not directly observable. Therefore, we 
follow Chen et al. (2007) and examine whether the association between D&O insurance and 
the cost of equity varies with proxies for D&Os’ private information. 
Our first set of proxies is based on earnings surprises, which can be justified for two 
reasons. First, D&Os have access to internal accounting records and know about earnings 
before it is publicly released to investors. Second, securities class action suits often result 
from bad outcomes (Kim and Skinner, 2012) and a large price drop driven by negative 
earnings news is a common trigger for shareholder litigations (Skinner, 1994). Field et al. 
(2005) also argue that the risk of litigation is heightened when a firm’s earnings are 
substantially lower than investors’ expectation. Gande and Lewis (2009) find that US firms 
with negative earnings surprises are more likely to be sued in class action suits. 
Specifically, for each quarterly earnings announcement made in the year during which 
the cost of equity is estimated, we compute abnormal return over the five trading days [-2, 
+2] centered on the announcement date. We measure earnings surprise (SURPRISE) as the 
median of the absolute values of announcement period abnormal returns. As a large 
negative earnings surprise has a greater impact on litigation than a large positive earnings 
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surprise, we also construct a proxy (NEG_SURPRISE) that only considers negative earnings 
surprises. Specifically, we set positive announcement period abnormal returns to zero and 
define NEG_SURPRISE as the median of the revised absolute values of abnormal returns. 
Our second set of proxies for D&Os’ private information is based on insiders’ trading 
activities. Prior studies (Seyhun, 1992) show that insider trading contains private 
information. Although insiders with private information do not necessarily trade, our 
premise is that on average, insiders with more private information trade more (Chen et al., 
2007). We define CEO_TRADE as an indicator variable that equals one if a CEO conducts 
any open market purchase or sell during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. We manually 
collect open market transactions for CEOs in our sample from the website of the System of 
Electronic Disclosure by Insiders (SEDI). As negative private information has a greater 
impact on litigation cost, we construct another proxy (CEO_SELL) that incorporates the 
direction of insiders’ trades. CEO_SELL equals one if a CEO has a net sell during a fiscal 
year (i.e., total sell greater than total purchase) and zero otherwise.  
One disadvantage of relying on insider trading data from SEDI is that SEDI only 
provides information on insider trades conducted after 2002. Therefore, our tests are based 
on a much smaller sample. To mitigate this problem, we also measure net selling activities 
of CEOs by the decrease in their stock ownership using an indicator variable CEO_SELL2 
that equals one if a CEO’s stock ownership in the firm decreases during the fiscal year, and 
zero otherwise. CEO ownership data is manually collected from proxy circular filings. A 
disadvantage of this proxy, however, is that it can contain larger measurement errors as a 
change in ownership is affected by other factors such as restricted stock grants. 
We then define an indicator variable (HIGH) denoting firms with more D&O private 
information. For SURPRISE (NEG_SURPRISE), HIGH equals one if SURPRISE 
(NEG_SURPRISE) is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. For CEO_TRADE, 
CEO_SELL and CEO_SELL2, we set HIGH equal to the proxy. We then augment the 
 
23 
baseline model with an interaction term between HIGH and DOICOV. The risk anticipation 
argument predicts a positive coefficient on the interaction term. 
Panel A of Table 6 shows level regression results. Columns (1) to (5) use D&Os’ private 
information measured by SURPRISE, NEG_SURPRISE, CEO_TRADE, CEO_SELL, and 
CEO_SELL2, respectively. In all regressions, we find a positive and significant coefficient on 
DOICOV, suggesting that a positive association between D&O insurance and the cost of 
equity exists in firms with a low level of D&Os’ private information. The coefficients on 
DOICOV×HIGH are statistically insignificant in all regression.12 Panel B of Table 6 reports 
change regression results. Inference is qualitatively the same. Specifically, coefficients on 
DOICOV are significantly positive except in Column (4). Coefficients on DOICOV×HIGH 
are insignificant in all regressions. 
To summarize, our evidence suggests that the association between D&O insurance and 
the cost of equity does not vary with proxies for private information. Nevertheless, 
interpretation of the evidence hinges on the ability of these proxies to capture D&Os’ private 
information that affects D&O insurance purchases and the future cost of equity. We 
acknowledge that we cannot completely rule out the risk anticipation argument. 
 
5.5. Evidence from an exogenous law change lowering D&Os’ legal liabilities 
To further substantiate our hypothesis, we exploit an exogenous change in Nevada’s 
Corporate Law in 2001 that reduced D&Os’ personal legal liabilities. Nevada swiftly 
changed its corporate law in 2001 to attract more firm incorporations. Before the law change, 
Nevada’s corporate law imposed similar default fiduciary duties on D&Os as those under the 
Delaware corporate law. After the law change, D&Os are only liable if their behaviors 
                                                            
12 To avoid a large price drop on earnings announcement dates, firms may voluntarily disclose bad earnings 
news earlier (Skinner, 1994). Therefore, the market reaction over a short window ([-2, +2]) around the earnings 
announcement date may not adequately capture D&Os’ private information on earnings surprise. To address 
this concern, we measure the market reaction over a longer window ([-30, +2]) and redefine SURPRISE and 
NEG_SURPRISE. Results are qualitatively similar. 
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involve both a breach of the duty of loyalty and an intentional fraud (or a knowing violation 
of law). This implies that D&Os are no longer liable for a violation of the duty of care, among 
others (Barzuza, 2012). We argue that this law change has a similar effect on reducing 
D&Os’ personal legal liabilities as an increase in the D&O insurance coverage. Importantly, 
the legislation process was short such that firms are unlikely to anticipate the change and 
quickly reincorporate in Nevada before the law change (Donelson and Yust, 2014).13 Thus, 
the change (in D&Os’ legal liabilities) is due to an exogenous change in law rather than a 
firm’s choice or D&Os’ risk anticipation.14 
We conduct a difference-in-differences test to determine whether the change in the cost 
of equity of Nevada-incorporated firms after the law change is greater than the change in 
the cost of equity of matched firms. We start from a list of Nevada-incorporated firms and 
verify whether they were incorporated in Nevada before the law change by manually 
checking each firm’s 10-K filing before the law change. The sample period includes three 
years before (years 1998 to 2000) and three years after (years 2002 to 2004) the law change. 
Observations in year 0 (year 2001) are excluded. The cost of equity is measured at the end of 
June each year. The control sample is constructed by choosing non-Nevada-incorporated 
firms from the same industries as the Nevada-incorporated firms, with similar size (i.e., size 
difference no more than 20% of the size of the Nevada firm), and with the closest average 
cost of equity during the pre-change period. The final sample consists of 30 pairs of firms 
(274 observations).15 
                                                            
13 Specifically, the law change was first discussed by the Nevada Senate Judiciary Committee on May 22, 2001. 
It was passed by the Nevada legislators on June 3, 2001 and was eventually signed into law by the Governor on 
June 15, 2001. Nevada made this swift law change because it wanted to retain and/or attract more firms that 
choose Nevada as the incorporation state so that the short-term budget shortfall could be reversed. In the longer 
run, Nevada also wants to strategically compete with other states (e.g., Delaware) as an incorporation state. See 
Barzuza (2012) for a detailed discussion. 
14 In addition, as the law change reduces the legal liabilities of D&Os, there is no obvious reason for 
Nevada-incorporated firms to significantly increase their D&O insurance after the law change. 
15 The 30 treatment firms in the final sample spread over 13 industries based on the Fama and French 48 
industry classification, although a high proportion of firms operate in the entertainment industry (6 firms, or 
20% of the sample) and the transportation industry (7 firms, or 23% of the sample). 
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Results are reported in Table 7. Both Columns (1) and (2) show a positive coefficient on 
the interaction between POST (the indicator for the period after the law change) and NV 
(the indicator for Nevada-incorporated firms). According to Column (2), the coefficient is 
1.352% (t = 2.564), indicating that the change in the cost of equity for Nevada-incorporated 
firms after the law change is 1.352% greater than that for matched firms. 
It is possible that the above result is driven by a contemporaneous adverse change in 
economic conditions of Nevada. To address this concern, we repeat the test after excluding 
Nevada firms whose headquarters are located in Nevada and their matched control firms. 
This step reduces the sample to 22 pairs of firms (197 observations). Inference based on 
results in Columns (3) and (4) is qualitatively the same.  
Overall, results reported in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 suggest that the positive association 
between D&O insurance and the cost of equity is unlikely to be due to risk anticipation 
alone.16 
 
6. Channels through which D&O insurance increases the cost of equity 
In this section, we provide evidence on the reporting/disclosure quality and risk-taking 
channels that we formulate in hypothesis development. Specifically, we examine whether 
D&O insurance is associated with proxies for financial reporting quality, stock liquidity, 
analysts’ forecast properties and stock beta. Such evidence can help shed light on the 
underlying economic mechanisms through which D&O insurance affects the cost of equity. 
6.1. D&O insurance and the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
As we have argued earlier, D&O insurance can increase the cost of equity through 
affecting a firm’s financial reporting and disclosure. Prior studies find that D&O insurance 
                                                            
16 Our results are related to Donelson and Yust (2004) who find that firm value and operating cash flows of 
Nevada-incorporated firms decrease after the law change relative to a matched sample of 
non-Nevada-incorporated firms. Our results suggest that the decrease in firm value is not only due to lower cash 
flows but also due to a higher discount rate. 
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reduces accounting conservatism (Chung and Wynn, 2008) and the tendency to issue bad 
news management earnings forecasts (Wynn, 2008). Prior studies also find D&O insurance 
increases the incidence of accounting restatements (Kim, 2006). While material accounting 
irregularities can lead to lawsuits, many securities class actions involve less serious 
allegations (Kim and Skinner, 2012). Therefore, we examine the association between D&O 
insurance and discretionary accruals to determine whether D&O insurance is linked to less 
egregious earnings management. In addition, Hutton et al. (2009) suggest that discretionary 
accruals are associated with price crash, which is an important trigger of shareholder 
litigation (Kim and Skinner, 2012). 
We estimate the following regression to determine whether D&O insurance is associated 
with earnings management as reflected in the absolute value of discretionary accruals: 
Ln|PADACi,t+1| = γ0 + γ1DIOCOVi,t +γ2ACCRi,t +γ3SIZEi,t +γ4Qi,t + γ5MAi,t+1 +  
γ6FINANCEi,t+1 + γ7LITRISKi,t +γ8MISS_LITRISKi,t + γ9LEVi,t + γ10LOSS i,t+1  
+γ11STDROA i,t +γ12CFO i,t+1 +γ13R&D i,t+1 + Industry and Year Indicators + εi,t+1, (3) 
 
where Ln|PADAC| is the logarithm of the absolute value of performance adjusted 
discretionary accruals developed by Kothari et al. (2005). We follow Ashbaugh et al. (2003) 
and use a logarithm transformation to correct for a violation of normality. Following Ali et al. 
(2007), we control for lagged accruals (ACCR), logarithm of total assets (SIZE), 
market-to-book (Q), litigation risk (LITRISK), leverage (LEV), whether a firm reports a loss 
(LOSS), past volatility of return on assets (STDROA), operating cash flow (CFO), and R&D 
intensity (R&D). In addition, we include two indicators for M&A and external financing 
activities (MA and FINANCE) to control for accruals management due to future acquisitions 
and financing activities. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 8. 
Results are reported in Panel A, Table 8. We find that the coefficient on DOICOV is 
positive and significant (0.832, t = 3.233), consistent with the notion that high D&O 
insurance coverage is associated with a low level of financial reporting quality. 
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6.2. D&O insurance and stock illiquidity 
Poor financial reporting shown above and other reporting and disclosure problems 
documented in prior studies (e.g., Chung and Wynn, 2008; Wynn, 2008) can result in a 
higher level of information asymmetry and hence a lower level of stock liquidity. We test the 
association between D&O insurance and stock illiquidity by estimating the following model: 
ILLIQi,t+1 = β0 + β1DOICOVi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3Qi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5ROAi,t + β6LnPRICEi,t + 
β7SDRETi,t + Year and Industry Indicators + i,t+1. 
(4) 
Following Daske et al. (2013), we employ two proxies to measure stock illiquidity. The 
first is (logarithm transformed) bid-ask spread and the second is (logarithm transformed) 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure. Their detailed definitions are outlined in notes to Table 
8. Following Amihud (2002), we require a firm-year to have data for at least 200 trading 
days, and exclude stocks with price lower than $5 at the beginning of a fiscal year to avoid 
microstructure issues associated with low-price stocks. We control for the logarithm of total 
assets (SIZE), market-to-book (Q), leverage (LEV), profitability (ROA), stock price 
(LnPRICE) and daily stock return volatility (SDRET). Results are reported in Panel B, 
Table 8. We find that DOICOV loads significantly positively in both models (1.000, t = 2.547, 
and 3.625, t = 4.381, respectively). Therefore, the evidence is consistent with the notion that 
D&O insurance reduces stock liquidity.  
 
6.3. D&O insurance and analysts forecast properties 
If D&O insurance increases a firm’s incentives to engage in low-quality reporting and 
disclosure, its level of information asymmetry should be higher. As a result, analysts and 
investors face a higher estimation risk when evaluating the firm, leading to larger forecast 
errors and a larger dispersion. We test this prediction by estimating the following model: 
FERRi,t+1 or FDISPi,t+1 = β0 + β1DOICOVi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3CORRi,t + β4STDROAi,t + 
β5|EPS i,t+1| + β6R&Di,t + β7ROAi,t +Year and Industry Indicators + i,t+1. 
(5) 
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Following Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Ali et al. (2007), FERR is the 12-month average of 
the absolute values of analysts’ earnings forecast errors, and FDISP is 12-month average of 
the inter-analyst dispersions of earnings forecasts. We scale them by stock price at the end 
of the previous fiscal year. Following Ali et al. (2007), we control for the logarithm of total 
assets (SIZE), past correlation between earnings and stock returns (CORR), past volatility 
of return on assets (STDROA), absolute value of change in EPS (|EPS i,t+1|), R&D 
intensity (R&D) and profitability (ROA). Panel C, Table 8 reports the results. Coefficients on 
DOICOV are positive and significant in both regressions (0.036, t = 2.049, and 0.033, t = 
3.654, respectively), consistent with the notion that that estimation risk is higher for firms 
with a higher level of D&O insurance.  
Taken together, the above evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that D&O 
insurance increases the cost of equity by lowering financial reporting and disclosure quality, 
leading to a lower level of stock liquidity and a higher estimation risk.  
 
6.4. D&O insurance and risk-taking 
We estimate the following regression to determine whether D&O insurance is associated 
with a firms’ exposure to market risk as measured by stock beta: 
FBETAi,t = β0 + β1DOICOVi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3Qi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5R&Di,t + β6CAPXi,t + 
β7LnCASHCOMPi,t +β8DELTAi,t + β9VEGAi,t + β10OUTDIRi,t + 
β11DOOWNi,t +Year and Industry Indicators + i,t, 
(6) 
 
where FBETAi,t is future stock beta estimated using a market model with monthly stock 
returns over the future 24 months (years t+1 to t+2). We follow Lin et al. (2013) and control 
for the logarithm of total assets (SIZE), market-to-book (Q), leverage (LEV), R&D intensity 
(R&D), capital expenditure (CAPX), risk-taking incentives or disincentives proxied by the 
cash compensation (LnCASHCOMP), delta (DELTA, CEO’s portfolio sensitivity to a $1 
increase in the stock price) and vega (VEGA, CEO’s portfolio sensitivity to a 1% change in 
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stock return volatility). We also follow Ashbaugh et al. (2005) and control for the proportion 
of outside directors (OUTDIR) and D&Os’ total stock ownership (DOOWN).  
Results are reported in Table 9. The coefficient on DOICOV is positive and significant 
(0.648, t = 1.928).17 This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that D&O insurance 
encourages D&Os’ risk-taking, though we acknowledge that it can also be consistent with 
the risk anticipation argument.  
 
6.5. D&O insurance and future cash flows 
As discussed in hypothesis development, risk-taking induced by D&O insurance may or 
may not benefit shareholders. If risk-taking benefits shareholders, D&O insurance should 
have a positive cash flow effect even though the cost of equity is also high as firms undertake 
more risky positive-NPV projects. However, our event study shows that investors read an 
increase in D&O insurance coverage negatively, suggesting that either D&O insurance does 
not increase future cash flows or the increase is not sufficiently large to offset the inflated 
discount rate. Nevertheless, we conduct a more direct test by examining the association 
between D&O insurance and future operating performance. If D&O insurance encourages 
risk-taking that benefits shareholders, it should be positively associated with future 
operating performance. Following Core et al. (2006), we measure operating performance by 
industry adjusted operating income before depreciation scaled by average assets (adjusted 
ROA). Specifically, we estimate the following regression: 
Adj. ROAi,t+N = β0 + β1DOICOVi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3Qi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5CAPXi,t + β6R&Di,t + 
β7DIVYLDi,t + β8STDRETi,t + β9XLISTi,t + Year Indicators + i,t+N, (7) 
where Adj. ROAt+N is the industry adjusted ROA of year t+N (N = 1, 2, 3). We control for the 
logarithm of assets (SIZE), Tobin’s Q (Q), leverage (LEV), capital expenditure (CAPX), R&D 
intensity (R&D), dividend yield (DIVYLD), stock return volatility (STDRET), a cross-listing 
                                                            
17 Lin et al. (2013) find that D&O insurance is positively associated with future stock return volatility and 
idiosyncratic risk. We find similar results in our study. 
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indicator (XLIST) and year fixed effects. Table 10 reports results for the OLS, 
Fama-MacBeth and firm fixed effects regressions. The coefficient on DOICOV is never 
significantly positive and is significantly negative in the Fama-MacBeth Regression at the 5% 
level in the regression of Adj.ROAt+1. Thus, there is no evidence that D&O insurance 
encourages risk-taking that benefits shareholders.18  
 
6.6. Cross listing and the association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity 
As some firms in our sample are cross listed in the US, it is natural to examine whether 
cross listing affects the association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity. 
Compared with Canada, the US has a more litigious environment (Baginski et al., 2002). 
The disciplining role of shareholder litigation is stronger in the US than in Canada. 
Therefore, the protection afforded by D&O insurance should be more important to D&Os 
when a firm is cross-listed in the US. Investors therefore should require a higher risk 
premium associated with D&O insurance for cross-listed firms.19 We thus expect the 
positive association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity to be more pronounced in 
firms cross-listed in the US.  
To test this prediction, we add an interaction term between cross-listing (XLIST) and 
DOICOV in Equation (1). Results are reported in Table 11. The coefficient on DOICOV is 
significantly positive (4.227, t = 1.866), suggesting that D&O insurance is positively 
associated with the cost of equity for non-cross-listed Canadian firms. The coefficient on 
XLIST×DOICOV is positive and significant (7.268, t = 2.012), suggesting that the 
association is more pronounced in cross-listed firms, supporting our prediction. 
 
                                                            
18 If risk-taking does not improve cash flow but increases the cost of equity, firm value should be lower. 
Consistent with this prediction, we confirm that firm value measured by industry adjusted Tobin’s Q is 
negatively associated with D&O insurance. This evidence is also consistent with the findings in Table 4 that the 
market reacts negatively to an increase in D&O insurance. 
19 Wynn (2008) also finds that liability coverage has a larger effect on disclosures of firms cross listed in the US. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this study, we hypothesize that D&O insurance increases a firm’s cost of equity by 
providing incentives for D&Os to lower care and vigilance in financial reporting/disclosure 
and to take more risks. We find that D&O insurance coverage is positively associated with 
the ex ante cost of equity. Investors also react negatively to the announcement of an increase 
in D&O insurance. In addition, a high level of D&O insurance is associated with low 
financial reporting quality, low stock liquidity, low analysts forecast accuracy and high 
forecast dispersion. We also find that D&O insurance is positively associated with a firm’s 
stock beta but is not positively associated with future cash flows or firm value. Overall, our 
evidence is consistent with the notion that D&O insurance shields D&Os from the discipline 
of shareholder litigation and lowers their level of care and vigilance in business decisions. 
Conceivably, the risk anticipation argument can also be a plausible explanation for our 
results. While we conduct extensive robustness tests and find no evidence consistent with 
the risk anticipation argument, we acknowledge that we are unable to completely rule it out. 
Given that our findings suggest an unintended consequence of D&O insurance, one may 
wonder why firms still purchase D&O insurance. A reason is that D&O insurance is often 
required by risk-averse D&O candidates. Second, the purchase of D&O insurance is 
invariably a decision of the board in practice and hence agency incentives can play a role. 
Third, securities litigation, and particularly a secondary market lawsuit, is subject to 
pocket-shifting (some shareholders gain at the expense of others) (Baker and Griffith, 2010). 
As a result, shareholders can have different views about D&O insurance, depending on their 
investment strategies and specific circumstances (e.g., the timing). Therefore, we are 
unlikely to observe a corner solution of zero D&O insurance.  
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
 Panel A: Summary statistics for D&O insurance and the cost of equity 
   Percentiles  
Variable Mean Std. Dev 25th 50th 75th N 
D&O insurance        
DINS (0/1) 0.709 0.454 0.000 1.000 1.000 2,856 
COVER_LIMIT (C$mm) 44.748 70.869 0.000 20.000 50.000 2,814 
DOICOV 0.045 0.076 0.000 0.020 0.051 2,805 
       
Cost of equity       
RAVG – RF (in %) 7.392 5.356 3.924 6.061 9.306 2,135 
 
Panel B: Cost of equity (RAVG – RF) by DOICOV groups  
 N Mean  Median Std. Dev.  
t-value 
(L-H) 
z-value for 
Wilcoxon test 
Full sample:       
Low DOICOV (L) 1,052 6.854 5.700 5.040 -4.473*** -4.930*** 
High DOICOV (H) 1,052 7.889 6.402 5.530   
Panel A presents summary statistics for variables on D&O insurance and the cost of equity. Panel B compares 
equity risk premium (RAVG – RF) between low coverage and high coverage groups. DINS (0/1) is an indicator 
variable that equals one if a firm has D&O insurance in the fiscal year and zero otherwise. COVER_LIMIT is the 
limit on the personal coverage portion of a D&O insurance policy in C$mm. DOICOV is the insurance coverage 
ratio, defined as COVER_LIMIT scaled by the average market value of common equity in the fiscal year. RAVG is 
the mean value of the implied cost of equity based on Gebhardt et al. (2001) (RGLS), Claus and Thomas (2001) (RCT), 
Ohlson and Jeuttner (2005) and implemented by Gode and Monanham (2003) (ROJ), and the modified PEG model 
in Easton (2004) (RMPEG). We require that all of the four cost of equity estimates be non-missing in computing RAVG. 
RF is risk free rate, defined as the yield to maturity of zero-coupon 10-year Canadian government bond. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 2 
D&O Insurance Coverage and the Cost of Equity 
Y= (RAVG – RF)t+1 
OLS regression 
 
(1) 
Fama-MacBeth  
regression 
(2) 
Firm fixed effects 
regression 
(3) 
Control for 
determinants of 
D&O insurance & 
cash holdings 
(4) 
DOICOVt 6.931*** 7.527*** 8.919*** 5.606*** 
 [3.755] [3.343] [3.492] [3.053] 
UBETAt+1 0.660** 0.631* -0.207 0.623* 
 [2.109] [2.076] [-0.753] [1.853] STD_RESRETt+1 9.599*** 11.645** 8.117*** 6.123** 
 [3.817] [3.004] [3.011] [2.285] LnMV t -0.357*** -0.433*** -0.273 -0.861*** 
 [-2.620] [-4.246] [-0.888] [-3.418] LnBM t 0.682*** 0.686*** 0.373 0.244 
 [3.043] [3.109] [1.173] [0.888] LEV t 4.547*** 4.227*** 2.525** 5.072*** 
 [5.731] [6.431] [2.317] [5.810] RATING t -0.064 -0.012 0.041 -0.089 
 [-0.810] [-0.246] [0.395] [-1.026] 
MISS_RATINGt -0.682 -0.120 0.658 -0.960 
 [-0.625] [-0.179] [0.433] [-0.784] 
LnRET12t+1 -1.887*** -1.748*** -2.108*** -1.843*** 
 [-8.065] [-4.461] [-8.423] [-6.958] FBIAS t+1 -12.577*** -11.690*** -7.799*** -12.797*** 
 [-6.335] [-4.810] [-3.513] [-6.011] FLTGt+1 7.464*** 8.289*** 7.376*** 8.110*** 
 [11.390] [15.948] [9.781] [14.833] 
XLISTt -0.160 -0.049 0.129 0.060 
 [-0.473] [-0.430] [0.251] [0.163] CASHt -0.306 -0.803 0.335 -0.053 
 [-0.238] [-1.118] [0.258] [-0.033] Additional controls  No No No Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes No 
Adj.R2 0.638 0.742 0.777 0.653 
N 2,025 2,025 2,025 1,566 
RAVG is the mean value of the implied cost of equity based on Gebhardt et al. (2001) (RGLS), Claus and Thomas 
(2001) (RCT), Ohlson and Jeuttner (2005) and implemented by Gode and Monanham (2003) (ROJ), and the 
modified PEG model in Easton (2004) (RMPEG). RF is risk free rate. DOICOV is the insurance coverage ratio. 
UBETA is market beta divided by one plus the ratio of long-term debt to market value of equity, where the 
market beta is estimated by the market model using previous 60 monthly returns (at least 24 monthly 
observations). STD_RESRET is the standard deviation of the residual monthly returns in the market model. 
LnMV is the natural log of the market value of equity at the fiscal year end. LnBM is the natural log of the ratio 
of book value of equity to market value of equity. LEV is defined as long-term debt divided by the sum of 
long-term debt and market value of equity. LnRET12 is the natural log of one plus the compounded stock returns 
during the previous 12 months. FBIAS is actual EPS from IBES minus forecasted EPS from IBES, scaled by 
price. When actual EPS from IBES is missing, actual EPS from COMPUSTAT is used. CASH is cash & cash 
equivalent scaled by book value of total assets. XLIST is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is cross 
listed in the US and zero otherwise. RATING is S&P long-term credit rating for issuer (#SPLTICRM). We 
convert the letter ratings into numbers as follows: 22 = AAA, 21 = AA+, 20 = AA, 19 = AA-, 18 = A+, 17 = A, 16 = 
A-, 15 = BBB+, 14 = BBB, 13 = BBB-, 12 = BB+, 11 = BB, 10 = BB-, 9 = B+, 8 = B, 7 = B-, 6 = CCC+, 5 = CCC, 4 = 
CCC-, 3 = CC, 2 = C, 1 = below C. RATING is set to 0 if missing. MISS_RAGING is an indicator variable that 
equals one for the observations missing RATING. Additional controls in Column (4) include the proportion of 
outside directors, research and development scaled by sales, return on assets, indicators for having M&As or 
divestitures in the previous year, and an indicator for reporting the existence of lawsuits in the previous year, 
board size, and stock ownership of directors and officers, operating cash flow/assets, volatility of operating cash 
flow, and capital expenditure/assets. t-statistics in the brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), 
respectively.
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TABLE 3  
Lead-lag Analysis of a Change in D&O Insurance Coverage and a Change in the Cost of Equity 
 
Y= (RAVG – RF) [t+] (in %)  = +1 
(1) 
 = -1 
(2) 
 = -2 
(3) 
DOICOV [t] 13.806** 9.212 -2.620 
 [1.973] [1.375] [-0.468] 
UBETA [t+] -0.296 -0.160 0.355 
 [-0.775] [-0.416] [0.797] 
STD_RESRET [t+] 8.609 8.373** 5.489 
 [1.484] [1.994] [0.828] 
LnMV [t+-1] -0.104 -0.144 -0.260 
 [-0.293] [-0.388] [-0.745] 
LnBM [t+-1]  -0.363 -0.086 0.104 
 [-1.345] [-0.296] [0.309] 
LEV [t+-1]  1.014 0.611 1.459 
 [1.016] [0.620] [1.436] 
LnRET12[t+] -1.953*** -1.863*** -2.015*** 
 [-9.367] [-9.233] [-8.878] 
FBIAS[t+] -5.598*** -6.794** -6.260*** 
 [-2.945] [-2.255] [-2.624] 
FLTG[t+] 6.454*** 5.830*** 5.816*** 
 [8.329] [7.213] [6.065] 
CASH [t+-1]  2.795** 2.406** 2.485** 
 [2.325] [2.056] [2.039] 
RATING [t+-1] 0.179 0.273 0.331 
 [1.185] [1.574] [1.450] 
MISS_RATING[t+-1] 0.134 0.117 0.105 
 [1.075] [0.930] [0.742] 
    
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.543 0.511 0.493 
N 1,441 1,243 1,048 
∆DOICOV of year t is defined as the change in dollar amounts of D&O insurance from year t-1 to year t, 
scaled by the average market value of equity of year t. For other variables, ∆X[t+] is defined as the 
change of variable X from year t+–1 to year t+. See the note to Table 2 for the definitions of RAVG, RF, 
UBETA, STD_RESRET, LnMV, LnBM, LEV, LnRET12, FBIAS, FLTG, CASH, RATING. 
MISS_RATING is a dummy variable that equals one if RATING is missing, and zero otherwise. We 
then set RATING as 0 if missing. t-statistics in the brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Market Reactions to Changes in D&O Insurance Coverage in Proxy Circulars  
 
Full sample 
Excluding observations with 
confounding earnings news 
Y = CAR[TP-2, TF+2] [1] [2] 
Intercept 0.062*** 0.066*** 
 [3.350] [2.744] 
DOICOV t -0.243** -0.292** 
 [-2.113] [-2.145] 
LnMV t -0.006** -0.007** 
 [-2.303] [-2.097] 
LnBM t 0.024*** 0.021*** 
 [5.280] [4.162] 
Adj.R2 0.037 0.031 
N 3,124 2,440 
This table presents results of market reactions to releases of proxy circulars that contain D&O insurance 
information. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the window [TP-2, TF+2]. 
Abnormal return is the prediction error of a market model estimated using daily returns over event day -281 to 
-31 before the proxy circular date (TP). We require at least 60 daily return observations to estimate the market 
model. DOICOV of year t is the change in D&O insurance coverage between year t-1 and year t, scaled by the 
average market value of equity over year t. LnMV is the logarithm of the market value of common shares 
outstanding measured at the end of year t. LnBM is the logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity to 
market value of common shares outstanding measured at the end of year t. The sample “excluding observations 
with confounding earnings news” removes the observations whose announcement dates of annual earnings are 
missing or fall within the period between three days before the proxy circular date (TP) and three days after the 
filing date (TF). t-statistics in the brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
D&O Insurance Coverage and the Cost of Equity: Controlling for Expected Litigation Risk  
 
Panel A: level regressions 
Y= (RAVG – RF)t+1 Coeff. t-stat 
DOICOVt 6.748*** [3.654] 
LITRISKt 1.557** [2.464] 
MISS_LITRISKt 0.994** [2.452] 
   
Controls in Table 2, Column (1) Yes  
Adj.R2 0.641  
N 2,025  
 
Panel B: change regressions 
Y=Δ(RAVG – RF)t+1 Coeff. t-stat 
ΔDOICOVt 12.732* [1.890] 
ΔLITRISKt 0.424 [0.835] 
MISS_ΔLITRISKt -0.178 [-0.439] 
   
Controls in Table 3 Yes  
Adj.R2 0.584  
N 1,441  
RAVG is the mean value of the implied cost of equity based on Gebhardt et al. (2001) (RGLS), Claus and Thomas 
(2001) (RCT), Ohlson and Jeuttner (2005) and implemented by Gode and Monanham (2003) (ROJ), and the 
modified PEG model in Easton (2004) (RMPEG). RF is risk free rate. DOICOV is the insurance coverage ratio. 
LITRISK is a proxy for ex-ante litigation risk constructed using the regression coefficients of the variables in 
Model 3 of Table 7 in Kim and Skinner (2012). LITRISK is the change in LITRISK from the previous year to 
the current year. LITRISK and LITRISK are set to zero if missing. MISS_LITRISK (MISS_LITRISK) are 
indicators that equals one if LITRISK (LITRISK) is missing, and zero otherwise. t-statistics in the brackets 
are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
The Effect of D&Os’ Private Information on the Association between D&O Insurance and the Cost of Equity 
 
Panel A: Level regressions 
Y= (RAVG – RF)t+1 
HIGH = 1 if 
SURPRISE is above 
sample median 
(1) 
HIGH = 1 if 
NEG_SURPRISE is 
above sample median 
(2) 
HIGH =  
CEO_TRADE 
(3) 
HIGH =  
CEO_SELL 
(4) 
HIGH =  
CEO_SELL2  
(5) 
DOICOVt 5.959** 4.863** 7.525* 7.881* 6.051** 
 [2.193] [2.011] [1.806] [1.935] [2.186] 
DOICOV *HIGH (0/1) 1.731 4.435 3.739 3.990 3.467 
 [0.458] [1.530] [0.584] [0.477] [0.632] 
HIGH (0/1) -0.044 -0.121 0.038 -0.221 -0.037 
 [-0.187] [-0.649] [0.122] [-0.524] [-0.106] 
Controls in Column (1), Table 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.614 0.615 0.637 0.637 0.609 
N 1,760 1,760 772 772 1,297 
 
Panel B: Change regressions 
Y=Δ(RAVG – RF)t+1 
HIGH = 1 if 
SURPRISE is above 
sample median 
(1) 
HIGH = 1 if 
NEG_SURPRISE is 
above sample median 
(2) 
HIGH =  
CEO_TRADE 
(3) 
HIGH =  
CEO_SELL 
(4) 
HIGH =  
CEO_SELL2  
(5) 
ΔDOICOVt 13.464* 18.331*** 29.430* 26.172 15.018* 
 [1.779] [2.697] [1.819] [1.584] [1.657] 
ΔDOICOV *HIGH (0/1) 6.675 -2.574 -8.459 6.377 8.887 
 [0.476] [-0.184] [-0.374] [0.212) [0.484] 
HIGH (0/1) -0.257 0.096 0.007 -0.417 0.085 
 [-1.614] [0.631] [0.029] [-1.302] [0.301] 
Controls in Table 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.571 0.571 0.541 0.542 0.579 
N 1,291 1,291 604 604 1,028 
RAVG is the mean value of the implied cost of equity. RF is risk free rate. We compute cumulative abnormal return over [-2, +2] around each quarterly 
earnings announcement made in fiscal year t+1. SURPRISE is the median value of the absolute value of the cumulative abnormal returns. To compute 
NEG_SURPRISE, we set all positive cumulative abnormal returns to zero and recalculate the median value. CEO_TRADE is an indicator variable that 
equals one if a CEO conducts open-market transactions (purchase or sell) in year t, and zero otherwise. CEO_SELL is an indicator variable that equals one if 
a CEO has net sell (i.e., total sell greater than total purchase) in year t, and zero otherwise. CEO_SELL2 is an indicator variable that equals one if a CEO’s 
stock ownership at the end of year t is less than that at the end of year t-1 and year t is not the last year of the CEO’s term, and zero otherwise. t-statistics in 
the brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
The Effect of Nevada’s Lowering Directors’ and Officers’ Legal Liabilities on the Cost of Equity 
 
All Nevada firms and matched control 
firms 
Excluding Nevada firms headquartered 
in Nevada and the corresponding 
matched control firms 
Y= (RAVG – RF)t+1 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Nevada firms (NV)  -0.770 -0.265 -1.134 -0.670 
 [-0.987] [-0.485] [-1.244] [-1.140] 
POSTt+1 -1.021 -0.144 -1.010 -0.161 
 [-1.514] [-0.302] [-1.279] [-0.361] 
NV*POSTt+1 1.610** 1.352** 2.003** 1.632*** 
 [2.035] [2.564] [2.230] [3.245] 
UBETAt+1 0.066 0.251 
  [0.176]  [0.601] 
STD_RESRETt+1  24.448 8.501 
  [1.549]  [0.495] 
LnMVt -0.699*** -0.759*** 
  [-3.467]  [-3.669] 
LnBMt 0.257 -0.043 
  [0.543]  [-0.098] 
LnRET12t+1  -2.696*** -2.599*** 
  [-6.324]  [-6.426] 
LEVt -0.272 3.845 
  [-0.135]  [1.612] 
FBIASt+1 -25.660*** -22.747*** 
  [-3.297]  [-2.900] 
FLTGt+1 9.543*** 10.657*** 
  [2.764]  [2.758] 
CASHt -3.595*** -2.123 
  [-2.766]  [-1.536] 
RATINGt 0.014 -0.003 
  [0.081]  [-0.014] 
MISS_RATINGt  0.352 0.025 
  [0.168]  [0.008] 
Adj.R2 0.005 0.468 0.007 0.498 
N 274 274 197 197 
In this table we examine the change in the cost of equity for firms incorporated in Nevada (treatment firms) 
compared with the change in the cost of equity for a matched control sample three years before and three after 
the Nevada law change in 2001. The control sample is constructed by choosing a non-Nevada incorporated firm 
from the same industry, with similar firm size (we require the ratio of market value of non-Nevada firm to that 
of Nevada firm is between 0.8 and 1.2), and with the closest average cost of equity over the pre-event period. 
RAVG is the mean value of the implied cost of equity based on Gebhardt et al. (2001) (RGLS), Claus and Thomas 
(2001) (RCT), Ohlson and Jeuttner (2005) and implemented by Gode and Monanham (2003) (ROJ), and the 
modified PEG model in Easton (2004) (RMPEG). RF is risk free rate. The cost of equity is estimated at the end of 
June of each year. See the note to Table 2 for the definitions of other variables. t-statistics in the brackets are 
based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
42 
 
TABLE 8 
D&O Insurance and Earnings Management, Stock Illiquidity, and Analyst Forecast Properties 
 
Panel A: absolute value of performance-adjusted abnormal discretional accruals 
Y =Ln|PADAC|t+1 Coeff. t-stat 
DOICOVt 0.832*** [3.233] 
ACCRt -0.397* [-1.724] 
SIZEt -0.049** [-2.249] 
Qt 0.049** [2.284] 
MAt+1 0.066 [1.270] 
FINANCEt+1 0.087 [1.590] 
LITRISKt 0.218** [2.069] 
MISS_LITRISKt 0.178* [1.663] 
LEVt -0.278 [-1.504] 
LOSSt+1 0.041 [0.633] 
STDROAt 1.255 [1.213] 
CFOt+1 0.654*** [2.590] 
R&Dt+1 0.001 [0.059] 
Industry and year fixed effects Yes  
Adj.R2 0.092  
N 2,467  
 
Panel B: stock illiquidity 
Y = SPREADt+1 ILLIQUIDt+1 
 (1) (2) DOICOVt 1.000** 3.625*** 
 [2.547] [4.381] 
SIZEt -0.407*** -1.175*** 
 [-14.707] [-23.776] 
Qt -0.093*** -0.335*** 
 [-4.515] [-9.153] 
ROAt -0.199** -0.657*** 
 [-1.974] [-3.491] 
Ln(PRICEt) -0.052 -0.098 
 [-1.093] [-1.164] 
SDRETt 0.174** 0.202 
 [2.468] [1.506] 
LEVt 0.943*** 2.005*** 
 [5.379] [5.383] 
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.665 0.796 
N 2,258 2,244 
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Panel C: analysts’ forecast error and dispersion 
Y = FERRt+1 FDISPt+1 
DOICOVt 0.036** 0.033*** 
 [2.049] [3.654] 
SIZEt -0.002*** 0.000 
 [-2.843] [-0.478] 
CORRt  0.006** 0.002* 
 [2.451] [1.674] 
STDROAt 0.110* 0.091*** 
 [1.882] [2.970] 
|EPS t+1| 0.375*** 0.107*** 
 [17.117] [9.146] 
R&Dt -0.010*** 0.008*** 
 [-2.592] [3.406] 
ROAt -0.074*** 0.000 
 [-5.290] [0.051] 
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.593 0.539 
N 1,893 1,814 
PADAC is performance adjusted discretional accruals. We estimate the following regression for Canadian firms 
within each year and industry defined by Fama-French 30 industry classification:  
ACCRi,t = 0 + 1 (1/ATi,t-1) + 2 (SALEi,t – ARi,t) + 3 PPEi,t + 4 ROAi,t + i,t.  
AT is total assets. ACCR is change in non-cash working capital (((#ACT–#CHE) – (#LCT–#DLC))) minus 
depreciation expense (#DP), scaled by ATi,t-1. SALEi,t is change in net sales in year t scaled by ATi,t-1. ARi,t is 
change in net accounts receivable scaled by ATi,t-1. PPEt is net property, plant and equipment of year t scaled by 
ATi,t-1. ROAt is income before extraordinary items of year t scaled by ATi,t-1. PADACi,t is defined as the residual 
term, it,. FERR t+1 is the 12-month average of the absolute value of analyst forecast error for earnings for year 
t+1 scaled by the price at the end of year t, where forecast error is defined as actual earnings minus the median 
analyst forecast. FDISP t+1 is the 12-month average of the standard deviation of individual analyst earnings 
forecast for earnings of year t+1, scaled by the price at the end of year t. Earnings forecasts data are obtained 
from the IBES summary file. SPREAD is the logarithm of the median daily bid-ask spread in a fiscal year. Daily 
bid-ask spread is defined as closing ask price minus closing bid price scaled by the average of closing ask and bid 
price. ILLIQUID is the logarithm of the median value of the ratio of daily absolute return to the trading volume 
in a fiscal year (Amihud, 2002). SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. Q is Tobin’s Q, defined as market value of 
common equity plus book value of total assets and minus book value of common equity, scaled by book value of 
total assets. M&A is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm engages in mergers and acquisition in a year 
and zero otherwise. FINANCE is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm raised finance in a year and zero 
otherwise. LITRISK is a proxy for ex-ante litigation risk constructed using the regression coefficients of the 
variables in Model 3 of Table 7 in Kim and Skinner (2012). LITRISK is set to zero if missing. MISS_LITRISK is 
an indicator that equals one if LITRISK is missing, and zero otherwise. LEV is defined as the ratio of long-term 
debt to the sum of long-term debt and market value of equity. LOSS is an indicator variable equals one if net 
income is negative and zero otherwise. CFO is operating cash flows scaled by lagged total assets. R&D is R&D 
expenditure scaled by sales, and missing value is set to zero. PRICE is share price at a fiscal year end. SDRET is 
the standard deviation of daily returns over a fiscal year. CORR is the Pearson correlation coefficient between 
earnings per share scaled by year-beginning price and stock returns over a fiscal year, computed using data in 
the previous ten years. STDROA is standard deviation of quarterly ROA over the previous five years, where 
quarterly ROA is defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by assets. |EPS i,t+1|is the absolute value 
of the difference in earnings per share between years t and t+1, scaled by stock price at the end of year t. 
t-statistics reported in the brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
D&O Insurance and Stock Beta 
 
Y = FBETAt Coeff. t-stat 
DOICOVt 0.648* [1.928] 
SIZEt -0.003 [-0.112] 
Qt 0.054** [2.243] 
LEVt -0.191 [-0.907] 
R&Dt  1.576*** [2.966] 
CAPXt 0.505 [1.331] 
Ln(CASHCOMPt) -0.011 [-0.829] 
DELTAt -0.236* [-1.838] 
VEGAt 0.835 [0.944] 
OUTDIRt -0.237 [-1.099] 
DOOWNt -0.001 [-0.449] 
   
Year fixed effects Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  
Adj.R2 0.237  
N 2,139  
This table presents results of the regression of a firm’s future exposure to market risk measured by stock 
beta on D&O insurance coverage. FBETAt is future stock beta estimated using a market model with monthly 
stock return over future two years t+1 to t+2, requiring 24 monthly returns. DOICOVt is the insurance 
coverage ratio. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. Q is the market to book value ratio, defined as market 
value of common equity plus book value of total assets and minus book value of common equity, scaled by the 
book value of total assets. LEV is the debt ratio. R&D is R&D expenditure scaled by sales, and missing value 
is set to zero. CAPX is capital expenditure scaled by total assets. LnCASHCOMP is the natural log of one 
plus CEO’s salary in cash, bonus and other annual compensation. DELTA is CEO’s portfolio sensitivity to a 
$1 increase in the stock price (in million). VEGA is CEO’s portfolio sensitivity to a 1% change in stock return 
volatility (in million). OUTDIR is the proportion of outside directors on the board. DOOWN is the portion of 
company shares owned by directors and officers. t-statistics in the brackets are based on standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 10 
D&O Insurance and Future Operating Performance 
 
Y = Adj. ROAt+1 Adj. ROAt+2 Adj. ROAt+3 
 
 
OLS 
Regression 
(1) 
Fama-MacBeth 
Regression 
(2) 
Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Regression 
(3) 
 
OLS 
Regression 
(4) 
Fama-MacBeth 
Regression 
(5) 
Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Regression 
(6) 
 
OLS 
Regression 
(7) 
Fama-MacBeth 
Regression 
(8) 
Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Regression 
(9) 
DOICOVt -0.012 -0.132** 0.023 0.026 -0.036 0.011 0.026 -0.025 0.037 
 [-0.234] [-2.109] [0.422] [0.489] [-0.764] [0.200] [0.396] [-0.455] [0.482] 
SIZEt -0.008* -0.009*** -0.003 -0.007 -0.008*** -0.011* -0.007 -0.008*** -0.022*** 
 [-1.905] [-4.274] [-0.479] [-1.540] [-3.121] [-1.729] [-1.360] [-3.248] [-2.802] 
Qt 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.015*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.008 
 [7.265] [11.948] [6.492] [4.477] [7.814] [2.836] [3.151] [5.457] [1.517] 
LEVt -0.063*** -0.066*** -0.013 -0.052** -0.056*** 0.025 -0.031 -0.037* 0.072** 
 [-2.884] [-3.980] [-0.600] [-2.094] [-3.640] [0.911] [-1.075] [-1.825] [2.219] 
CAPXt 0.033 0.027 0.038 0.053 0.061* 0.017 0.066 0.069* 0.024 
 [0.750] [0.684] [0.587] [1.082] [1.882] [0.263] [1.136] [1.774] [0.399] 
R&Dt 0.173 0.228*** -0.333** 0.276 0.245*** -0.165 0.352* 0.345*** -0.033 
 [1.135] [3.365] [-2.436] [1.593] [2.904] [-0.922] [1.765] [6.445] [-0.135] 
DIVYLDt 0.003 -0.012 -0.075 -0.198* -0.216*** -0.186 -0.308** -0.460*** -0.329** 
 [0.033] [-0.153] [-0.687] [-1.745] [-3.333] [-1.139] [-2.088] [-4.579] [-1.995] 
STDRETt 0.092 0.144** 0.069 0.025 0.026 0.043 0.000 -0.017 0.025 
 [1.300] [2.162] [0.828] [0.323] [0.753] [0.474] [0.002] [-0.273] [0.272] 
XLISTt 0.025** 0.020*** -0.038 0.029** 0.027*** -0.038 0.031** 0.030*** -0.028 
 [2.294] [3.348] [-1.437] [2.444] [4.471] [-1.543] [2.285] [4.695] [-1.127] 
          
Year fixed-effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj.R2 0.263 0.321 0.751 0.197 0.241 0.733 0.159 0.206 0.733 
N 1,915 1,915 1,915 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,460 1,460 1,460 
ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by average total assets. Industry-adjusted ROA (i.e., Adj.ROA) is defined as ROA minus the 
median ROA of all firms in the same fiscal year and in the same industry. DOICOVt is the insurance coverage ratio. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. 
CAPX is capital expenditure scaled by total assets. LEV is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-term debt and market value of equity. 
R&D is R&D expenditure scaled by net sales, and missing value is set to zero. DIVYLD is total dividends scaled by the market value of common equity at 
the end of the fiscal year. STDRET is standard deviation of monthly returns over the 60 months ending at the fiscal year end. XLIST is an indicator variable 
that equals one if a firm is cross listed in the US and zero otherwise. t-statistics reported in the brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering 
at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 11 
D&O Insurance and the Cost of Equity and Cross Listing in the US 
 
Y = (RAVG – RF) t+1 Coeff. t-stat 
DOICOVt  4.227* [1.866] 
XLISTt*DOICOVt 7.268** [2.012] 
XLISTt -0.509 [-1.588] 
UBETA t+1 0.662** [2.156] 
STD_RESRETt+1 9.747*** [3.937] 
LnMVt -0.339** [-2.563] 
LnBMt 0.696*** [3.100] 
LEVt 4.229*** [5.429] 
RATINGt -0.033 [-0.419] 
MISS_RATINGt -0.244 [-0.228] 
LnRET12t+1 -1.870*** [-8.119] 
FBIASt+1 -12.596*** [-6.414] 
FLTGt+1 7.443*** [11.367] 
CASHt -0.384 [-0.297] 
   
Industry and year fixed effects Yes  
Adj.R2 0.640  
N 2,025  
This table examines whether the association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity varies between firms 
that are only listed in Canada and firms that are also cross listed in the US. RAVG is the mean value of the 
implied cost of equity based on Gebhardt et al. (2001) (RGLS), Claus and Thomas (2001) (RCT), Ohlson and 
Jeuttner (2005) and implemented by Gode and Monanham (2003) (ROJ), and the modified PEG model in Easton 
(2004) (RMPEG). RF is risk free rate. DOICOV is the insurance coverage ratio. UBETA is market beta divided by 
one plus the ratio of long-term debt to market value of equity, where the market beta is estimated by the market 
model using previous 60 monthly return (at least 24 monthly observations). STD_RESRET is the standard 
deviation of the residual monthly returns in the market model. LnMV is the natural log of the market value of 
equity at the fiscal year end. LnBM is the natural log of the ratio of book value of equity to market value of 
equity. LEV is defined as long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and market value of equity. 
LnRET12 is the natural log of one plus the compounded stock returns during the previous 12 months. FBIAS is 
actual EPS from IBES minus forecasted EPS from IBES, scaled by price. When actual EPS from IBES is missing, 
actual EPS from COMPUSTAT is used. CASH is cash & cash equivalent scaled by book value of total assets. 
XLIST is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is cross listed in the US and zero otherwise. RATING is 
S&P long-term credit rating for issuer (#SPLTICRM). We convert the letter ratings into numbers as follows: 22 = 
AAA, 21 = AA+, 20 = AA,19 = AA-, 18 = A+, 17 = A, 16 = A-, 15 = BBB+, 14 = BBB, 13 = BBB-, 12 = BB+, 11 = BB, 
10 = BB-, 9 = B+, 8 = B, 7 = B-, 6 = CCC+, 5 = CCC, 4 = CCC-, 3 = CC, 2 = C, 1 = below C. RATING is set to 0 if 
missing. MISS_RAGING is an indicator variable that equals one for the observations missing RATING. 
t-statistics in the brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
